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Environmental Audits, Privileges from

Disclosure, and Small Business Penalty
Policies*
JAMES E. MEASON**
INTRODUCTION

The adage made famous by MAD magazine's star, Alfred E. Neuman,
epitomizes. most companies' positions regarding environmental matters:
"What - me worry?" Little do these companies know that federal environmental enforcement is on the upswing, and Uncle Sam loves poster children
for its enforcement programs. Speaking of enforcement programs, in fiscal
year 1997, the latest figures that are available, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) initiated 4,075 cases. There were 278 criminal
referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), 1,979 civil actions, and
1,818 administrative cases. State agency enforcement efforts accounted for
another 10,894 cases.' Total civil and criminal referrals were the highest in
USEPA history. Not bad for a year's work! Fortunately for business, there
are several new state and federal initiatives that may take some of the sting out
of environmental enforcement efforts.
I.

THE CHANGING FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE

A.

OVERVIEW

USEPA's latest statistics reveal two startling trends in environmental
enforcement: an increased resort to criminal prosecutions, and the specific
targeting of individual company employees, rather than the company itself, for
environmental crime prosecutions.

* Mr. Meason presented this topic on March 26, 1998, at Northern Illinois University
College of Law's seminar on "Market-Based Solutions to Environmental Regulation." This
article is based on that presentation.
** Mr. Meason is an Illinois-based attorney with a national practice specializing in
environmental, energy, and administrative law. Previously, he was a federal enforcement
attorney in Washington, D.C. Mr. Meason is a member of the Illinois and District of Columbia
Bars. He received a B.S. from Southern Illinois University, an M.A. from Georgetown
University, and a J.D. from The American University.
1. Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report, FY 1997, Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2-1, 2-2
(July, 1998).
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In fiscal year 1997, criminal cases accounted for 14% of all federal
environmental cases. Additionally, over the past six years, the federal
government's criminal enforcement efforts have done an almost complete
about face, with about 75% of criminal pleas or guilty verdicts in 1995 and
1996 coming against individual company employees as compared with
roughly only 20% in 1991. Sources within USEPA and DOJ confirm that the
1995, 1996, and 1997 statistics are not flukes.
B.

FY 1997 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

In all respects, 1997 appears to have been another banner year for
criminal environmental enforcement: the federal government assessed $189.3
million in criminal penalties; USEPA initiated 551 cases and referred 278
cases to DOJ (the previous high referral marks were 262 in 1996, 256 in 1995,
and 220 in 1994); 322 corporate and individual defendants were indicted; and
sentencing constituted 195.9 years of jail time.2
C.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RATIONALE BEHIND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

In conversations with USEPA and DOJ representatives, the change in
enforcement emphasis is directly attributable to the government's belief that
the threat of a criminal conviction "plays in Peoria." Put another way, with
the threat of a criminal indictment, trial, conviction, and the possibility of a
hefty fine and jail time, government officials believe that individuals will pay
greater heed to environmental laws and regulations. Given the stigma
attached to a criminal conviction, the government hopes individuals will not
simply shrug off a regulatory violation as only the company's potential
liability.
USEPA cites the 1990 enactment of the Pollution Prosecution Act as the
muscle behind this enforcement trend The law made a number of changes
to the agency's criminal enforcement program, including increasing the ranks
of criminal inspectors to 200 by October 1, 1995. As recently as 1991, there
were only 62 agents.
D.

PROTECT YOURSELF

-

KNOW THE LAW

While the overwhelming majority of environmental cases are civil or
administrative in nature, the threat of criminal enforcement actions, which in
1997 accounted for 14% of all federal cases, is significant. Therefore, anyone
2.
3.

Id. at 2-4.
42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1970) (amended 1990).
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associated with a company's operations and management activities should
gain an understanding of how the law views personal criminal liability.
Generally speaking, in the event that civil litigation arises over any
particular business activity, a company officer or employee who acted within
the scope of his or her company authority will not be personally liable for that
business activity - any liability will attach to the company itself. Moreover,
a company will be responsible for the criminal acts of its officers and
employees who act within the scope of their employment. For example, a
paper manufacturing company employs a loading dock supervisor to manage
its outbound customer shipments. The supervisor's purposeful placement of
a bomb in a shipment to a company customer most likely will not subject the
employer to criminal sanctions, because placing bombs in shipments of paper
is not within the scope of the supervisor's employment. Instead, the
supervisor himself probably will face criminal prosecution.
Over the years, the courts have woven theories under which company
officers and employees can be held criminally responsible for their actions.
Surfacing in the 1943 U.S. Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Dotterweich, the
court published what has become known as the "responsible relation" theory
of criminal responsibility.4 The small company repackaged and relabeled
drugs to sell through mail orders. The government alleged that the drugs were
misbranded/adulterated.
Although the government neither alleged nor proved that the company
president himself knew the facts or participated in the distribution of the
drugs, the court held that criminal responsibility attached to the president, who
could at least have gained information about the condition of the products.
The court placed the burden on an "otherwise innocent" person who stood in
a "responsible relation" to a public danger.
After Dotterweich,some legal observers opined that, because of the small
size of the company, the law was unclear as to whether the responsible
relation theory would apply to larger organizations, especially those with well
developed management structures. That question finally was answered by the
U.S. Supreme Court thirty years later in U.S. v. Park, a case involving the
president of a large company being tried for causing the sale of unsanitary
food.5 That opinion enunciated what has come to be known as the "resporisible corporate agent" doctrine. While acknowledging that, as the company's
chief executive officer, "he was responsible for any result which occurs in
[the] company," Mr. Park's defense was that the company had an organiza-

4.
5.

320 U.S. 277 (1943).
421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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tional structure that placed various management responsibilities in several
dependable company departments.
In rejecting the company president's defense, the court observed that a
person is criminally liable when a person "had, by reason of his position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance,
or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do
so." The court "focused on the issue of [one's] authority with respect to the
conditions that formed the basis of the alleged violations." 7
Do not take comfort in the fact that these cases involved high level
company officials. There is nothing in the "responsible relation" or
"responsible corporate agent" doctrines that limits their application to
company presidents or other officers and directors. In fact, anyone meeting
the applicable criteria can be found criminally liable.
E.

CRIMINAL CASE SELECTION CRITERIA

After gaining a basic understanding of the law, it is also instructive to
know how USEPA and DOJ decide, at least in theory, to "go criminal" in any
particular case. Broad standards on this issue are laid out in a January 12,
1994, memorandum from the director of USEPA's Office of Criminal
Enforcement regarding "The Exercise of Investigative Discretion." Those
standards are: significant environmental harm and culpable conduct or intent.
The environmental harm can be actual or threatened. Examples of actual
harm are illegal discharges, releases, or emissions that have an identifiable and
significant harmful impact on human health or the environment. Threatened
harm is less concrete, and is highly situation driven. It can be demonstrated
by actual or threatened discharges, releases, or emissions. Additional factors
include the failure to report such releases and whether a non-compliant trend
or attitude held by the regulated community may benefit from the deterrent
effect of a criminal investigation.
Culpability is based on any history of repeat violations, deliberate
misconduct resulting in a violation, the concealment of misconduct or
falsification of required records, tampering with monitoring or control
equipment, and the operation of pollution-related activities without a permit,
license, manifest, or other required documentation.

6.
7.

Id. at 674-75.
Id. at 675.
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II.

SELF HELP TOOL: THE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT

Given the levels of federal and state enforcement efforts, and the
potential personal downside to environmental noncompliance, it is no wonder
that one of the leading topics in the environmental field is the advisability of
conducting an "environmental audit." Companies may not be able to protect
audit results from disclosure in legal proceedings, and so audits could be used
against companies by others. Because of the potential liabilities, it is
imperative that the audit's findings remain confidential to the maximum extent
allowable by law. Done correctly, an environmental audit may save your skin.
A. WHAT IS AN "ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT"?

Conceptually speaking, it is a company's attempt to document environmental, worker, and public safety violations, risks, and liabilities. Conducted
by company personnel or consultants, audit findings are commonly written up
in audit reports. Since an environmental audit generally will include a full
discussion of environmental problems, it is imperative that the audit findings
remain confidential. Consequently, the most important motivating factor in
conducting an audit is the potential privilege from disclosure to regulatory
agencies or third parties. Many states, as well as the federal government,
require companies to meet specific criteria in order to avail themselves of such
disclosure privileges.
B.

WHY WOULD A COMPANY WANT TO CONDUCT AN
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT?

There is no single answer to this question. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that most companies either do not conduct audits either out of ignorance of
available programs and trends, or because the perceived costs outweigh perceived benefits. Of those that do audit their regulatory compliance activities,
the major motivating factor is determining where their companies stand with
regard to compliance with environmental regulations in order to correct any
problems before they are discovered by a governmental agency or third party.
C.

WHY IS THERE CONTROVERSY OVER THIS PRACTICE?

First, environmental audits only relatively recently became a "front
burner" issue because of regulatory reform initiatives at the state and federal
levels. Keep in mind, however, that this is not a new topic; environmental
audits have gained substantial industry attention several times in the past
decade.
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Second, the controversy does not involve the actual conducting of an
environmental audit itself, but rather concerns the confidentiality, or
privileged status, of audit findings. Governmental and environmental groups
fear that companies may try to hide behind their audit reports while not
correcting the problems found. Such action would secure these companies an
economic advantage over their market rivals who comply with applicable laws
and regulations, and would permit them to continue to contaminate the
environment and threaten public safety.
Businesses, on the other hand, fear that even though companies make
their best efforts to comply with federal, state, and local laws and regulations,
existing legal privileges are inadequate and governmental entities may seek
to obtain copies of these reports in order to initiate enforcement proceedings.
These reports would serve to verify the results of government investigations
or act as a "road map" to previously undiscovered environmental violations,
and ultimately assist regulatory agencies in assessing penalties for a company's honest, good faith compliance efforts. Along those same lines, another
business fear is that private parties may seek to obtain copies of these audits
from governmental agencies or from the company itself in order to sue the
company for damages for the violations revealed in the report.
D.

GIVEN THE CONTROVERSY, ARE ANY COMPANIES CONDUCTING AUDITS?

A 1995 survey by the Conference Board reveals 90% of the companies
surveyed engage in some type of environmental auditing. A 1995 Price
Waterhouse survey indicates that 75% of the survey respondents have
environmental auditing programs in place. A 1994 Investor Responsibility
Research Center survey found 85% of those surveyed perform environmental
audits, and a 1992 Arthur Anderson poll demonstrated a 60% audit rate.
These four studies are subject to criticism for not reflecting the total business
community, focusing instead on larger enterprises.
In contrast to the focus on large companies, my own informal survey of
environmental consulting firms and small and medium sized companies
indicates quite different results - not only an extremely low audit rate, but
also an even fewer number of companies who were even familiar with the
term "environmental audit." Of those few companies that were familiar with
the term, the prevailing view on whether conducting an environmental audit
was advisable was "don't fix what ain't broken."
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III.
A.

PROTECT YOUR COMPANY: LEARN ABOUT AUDIT LAWS AND
POLICIES AND SMALL BUSINESS PENALTY PROGRAMS

USEPA'S CURRENT AUDIT POLICY

On December 22, 1995, USEPA published its "Incentives for Self-

Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations."'

USEPA was forced to reevaluate its 1986 "Environmental Auditing Policy
Statement" in light of increased calls for reform from business and political
pressure exerted at both the state and federal levels. While an important
development with regard to federal enforcement actions, USEPA's policy has
no legal effect on state or local government enforcement activities or private
lawsuits.
USEPA's new environmental audit policy:
1.

2.

3.

Waives (100%) punitive (gravity-based) penalties for
violations voluntarily discovered, and promptly disclosed (within 10 days) and corrected (within 60 days),
through an environmental audit or due diligence
investigation; and
Reduces punitive penalties by 75% for violations
voluntarily discovered, and promptly disclosed and
corrected, as a result of an undocumented compliance
effort; but
Retains economic benefit penalties.9

USEPA also generally commits itself to not recommending criminal
prosecutions and refraining from routinely demanding the disclosure of audits.
Thus, a company conducting an audit or other compliance activities meeting
all of the requirements will deflect most, if not all, of the punitive penalties.
B.

WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT THE NEW POLICY?

USEPA had issued an "interim policy" earlier in 1995,1" which served as
the basis for the new policy. Previously, a company's voluntary environmental audit or "voluntary self-evaluation" appropriate to the size and nature of
8. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
9. Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses, 61 Fed. Reg.
27,984-87 (1996).
10. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995).
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the company qualified for potential full punitive penalty reduction."l Today,
this terminology is gone, and USEPA limits the full waiver opportunity to
formal (i.e., documented) processes. Secondly, USEPA's new policy installs
an "all or nothing" partial punitive penalty reduction of 75% for undocumented compliance activities if each and every -specified condition is met.
USEPA now takes the position "that all of the conditions ... are reasonable
and essential to achieving compliance." Read another way, undocumented
compliance activities falling short of total adherence to the specified
conditions will garner no penalty reduction credit. USEPA's former position
was that it would reduce a punitive penalty "up to 75%" if "most, but not all"
of a series of conditions were met.12 Not only does USEPA require strict
adherence to all of the conditions, USEPA also incorporated new, more
restrictive criterion into the conditions applicable to penalty mitigation. For
example, a company cannot have a history of repeat violations; no such
restriction existed previously. Moreover, USEPA excludes violations
involving "serious actual harm" or "imminent and substantial endangerment"
to human health or the environment; USEPA had only excluded serious actual
harm from 75% punitive penalty reduction eligibility in its interim policy. 3
Finally, the agency fixes the time at 60 days after discovery in which to notify
USEPA of a violation; previously, it was within a "reasonable time." 4
C.

NEW POLICY ANALYSIS

To qualify for 100% punitive penalty reductions, companies must
discover violations through an environmental audit or a process known as
"due diligence." "Environmental audit" is defined as a "systematic,
documented, periodic and objective review ... of facility operations and
practices related to meeting environmental requirements." USEPA defines
"due diligence" to encompass "systematic efforts, appropriate to the size and
nature of its business, to prevent, detect and correct violations ....
" USEPA
provides general guidance on how to conduct due diligence, including the
establishment of company policies and procedures instituting a comprehensive
environmental compliance program. Implicit in USEPA's discussion of its
policy is that due diligence investigations must be documented. USEPA does
not require a comprehensive multi-media (air, land, water) audit. Rather, a

11.

12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 16,875-76.
Id. at 16,877.
Id.
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company can limit the scope of the audit as narrowly as it wishes, both in
terms of facilities and contaminants.
Regardless of whether a company seeks full or partial relief from a
punitive penalty, in order to receive the penalty mitigation benefit, a company
must not only identify and disclose the violation, but also must expeditiously
correct it, remedy any harm caused by it, and certify in writing to the
appropriate agencies that the violation has been corrected. This provision
permits a company to protect the audit report from full disclosure, and allows
the agency involved to initiate official closure of the matter. In USEPA's
mind, the more independent the personnel are in conducting the aidit, the
better. In fact, if in-house personnel are utilized, USEPA will require more
documentation that the company corrected the violation and remedied the
harm. Likewise, since due diligence investigations are not as formal as audit
activities, USEPA generally requires greater showings of proof in due
diligence cases.
The entire program hinges on "voluntary" efforts, no matter whether one
focuses on a formal environmental audit or due diligence investigation or on
less formal, undocumented activities. It is worth mentioning that USEPA's
application of the term "voluntary" to various scenarios could be troubling.
USEPA understandably requires that companies identify and disclose
violations prior to: "the commencement of a federal[,] state or local agency
inspection, investigation, or information request; notice of a citizen suit; legal
complaint by a third party; [and] the reporting of the violation to USEPA by
a 'whistleblower' employee." USEPA also requires that a company identify
and disclose violations prior to the "imminent discovery of the violation by a
regulatory agency." Just what does USEPA cover by the "imminent discovery" provision? Probably nothing, but potentially everything. Depending on
one's perspective, USEPA gave itself either a catchall provision to encompass
situations not envisaged at the time the policy was written and therefore not
covered by its provision. The escape hatch view recognizes the fact that
virtually anything could be characterized as "imminent discovery," thereby
restoring USEPA's broad penalty powers.
D.

FUNDAMENTAL POLICY CRITICISMS

One can criticize USEPA's policy on several grounds. First, instead of
issuing a "policy statement," USEPA could have issued a regulation. The
former is not binding on an agency, while the latter is. Consequently, many
believe USEPA has too much discretion in deciding whether to follow the
policy in any given case. USEPA made a weak attempt to alleviate that
concern in the policy's preamble, maintaining it was "taking steps" to ensure
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consistency and predictability. Unfortunately for USEPA, the policy itself
states: "The policy is not final agency action, and is intended as guidance."
One also can criticize USEPA's characterization of the status of DOJ
criminal referrals. While USEPA may not recommend to DOJ that criminal
charges be filed, DOJ can institute such action, and civil suits, on its own.
DOJ has since stated it will not prosecute violations of environmental statutes
discovered through self audits if the company reports them to regulatory
agencies and corrects those violations.
Additionally, environmentalists and plaintiffs' groups decry what in their
minds i's the increased secrecy permitted by the policy, and call for USEPA to
make public more information, especially that on which penalty mitigation is
based. This concern appears to be misplaced since USEPA specifically stated
that it is opposed to a statutory evidentiary privilege for audit reports, and the
Freedom of Information Act, which requires the federal government to
disclose its records to the public, governs records submitted to, or developed
by, USEPA.
E.

FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM - SMALL BUSINESS FLEXIBILITY

Another important federal initiative is regulatory reform. On April 21,
1995, President Clinton ordered all federal agency heads to implement
regulatory reform policies to reduce the regulatory compliance burden on
small businesses. Consequently, USEPA implemented an interim policy on
June 23, 1995, and issued a final policy on May 20, 1996."5 The program
promises full or partial penalty waivers (both punitive and economic benefit)
to small businesses in exchange for correcting all violations.
To qualify for the program, a small business must employ 100 or fewer
employees on a company-wide basis. USEPA's small business policy
establishes the following five eligibility criteria for full penalty mitigation:
1.

2.

15.
(1996).

The company made a good faith effort to comply with
applicable environmental requirements by conducting
an environmental audit or receiving on-site compliance
assistance from a government or government supported
program, and the company disclosed the violation
before it was reported to or discovered by a regulatory
agency;
The violation is not a repeat violation;

Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses, 61 Fed. Reg. 27,984
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3.
4.
5.

The business corrects the violation within'180 days of
its discovery;
The violation does not cause actual serious harm, or
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to,
public health, safety, or the environment; and
The violation does not involve criminal conduct.

It is difficult to judge the success of this program; USEPA's Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance does not keep records of the numbers
of small businesses participating, as USEPA's regional offices are the major
players in this effort.
F.

STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES

USEPA once was openly hostile to state efforts to provide protections to
industry for coming forward with information about environmental violations,
but now sends out mixed signals. Until the release of its new audit policy,
USEPA threatened increased enforcement action in states passing their own
audit laws. 6 With the publication of the new audit policy, USEPA now
accepts such state efforts, but qualifies its acceptance with the proviso that
these efforts not threaten public health or the environment, or make it
profitable not to comply. The honeymoon did not last long, however, as
USEPA again is threatening states, but this time under a different legal
rationale: state laws can deprive those states of the authority necessary to
enforce certain Federal Clean Air Act requirements.
The lesson here is that USEPA lost the first hand of the poker game
its threats of targeting specific states with increased enforcement activities
was a pair of deuces. USEPA simply did not have the resources to make a
credible threat, and state legislatures and industry called its bluff. The next
hand - federal program delegations, may ultimately prove to be a winner for
the agency.
Legislation to protect environmental audit findings from disclosure has
been introduced in nearly every state legislature. Roughly half of the states,
including Illinois, have passed laws providing some level of privilege. Oregon
passed the first environmental audit privilege law in 1993. DOJ's position on
the effect of state privilege laws on federal enforcement efforts is that while
audits may be privileged under state law, they are not privileged under federal
law.
-

16. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875, 16,878 (1995).
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ILLINOIS' ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE LAW

On January 24, 1995, Illinois enacted its own environmental audit
privilege law, 7 becoming the first major industrial state to do so. The law
recognizes an environmental audit privilege "to protect the confidentiality of
communications relating to voluntary internal environmental audits."' 8 An
audit report is deemed "privileged information" and is not admissible as
evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 9 Further, those
involved in conducting an environmental audit, such as consultants and
company employees, may not testify regarding the environmental audit or any
environmental audit report.'0
The law defines "environmental audit" as a voluntary, internal, and
comprehensive evaluation designed to identify and prevent noncompliance
and to improve compliance.2' The law defines "environmental audit report"
as a set of documents prepared as a result of an environmental audit, and must
include a written response to the findings of the audit.22
There are, effectively, two major exceptions to the privilege: it is lost if
a company fails "to take appropriate corrective action *.. within a reasonable
time,"" and documents otherwise meeting the definition of an "environmental
audit report" are not privileged from disclosure unless a written response to
the findings is contained in the report.24
As is true with other state laws, the Illinois law is binding in Illinois state
and local legal proceedings involving facilities in Illinois; the law probably is
not controlling law in federal enforcement matters or for facilities located
outside of the state. Perhaps most important is the law's failure to protect
companies from enforcement actions or other legal proceedings - no
statutory immunity exists.
Possibly because the law is so new, it is as yet untested in the courts.
Interesting, however, is the fact that the Illinois Attorney General's Office
knows of no assertions of the privilege. Thus, companies may be ignoring the
protections afforded by the new law, believing instead that the potential cost
of an audit outweighs any potential benefits.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
Id. § 52.2(a).
Id. § 52.2(b).
Id. § 52.2(c).
Id. § 52.2(i).
Id.
Id. § 52.2(d)(2)(C)
Id. § 52.2(e)(1).
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ILLINOIS' SMALL BUSINESS AMNESTY PROGRAM

In April of 1995, Illinois also instituted a pilot amnesty program for small
businesses known as "Clean Break." The program initially was limited in
scope to a two-county region in the Rockford area, but was open to all
industries in that area. The Rockford Area Chamber of Commerce played a
major role in encouraging private sector participation. The program operated
simply: in exchange for an amnesty/compliance agreement, businesses agreed
to come into compliance within a reasonable time. In turn, the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency (LEPA) agreed not to refer the violations for
legal action. USEPA's small business program is similar to Clean Break.
Interestingly, USEPA refused to issue a Clean Break support letter to IEPA,
but a "gentleman's agreement" has thus far avoided federal enforcement
actions based on information divulged during Clean Break.25
The Clean Break pilot program was deemed extremely successful by
IEPA and the business community alike; the program saw 105 participants,
and of those, 42 amnesty agreements were concluded. In January, 1996, IEPA
and the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs extended
the program statewide to three industry groups (auto body shops, auto
mechanical repair shops, and printers). This stage of Clean Break had 278
participants and 173 amnesty agreements, far fewer than IEPA had expected
based on its Rockford experience.26
In an attempt to salvage the program, IEPA expanded Clean Break to all
industries, but this likewise was ill fated, and IEPA canceled this phase of the
Clean Break effort at the end of 1997. This phase had 413 participants, and
IEPA estimates roughly 60% of these companies have entered, or will enter,
into amnesty agreements.27
]EPA has reconstituted the program, but in a much scaled-back form,
returning it to its Rockford roots: limited windows of opportunity (i.e., three
months) and private sector sponsorship (e.g., trade associations or chambers
of commerce).2" IEPA hopes that a narrowly crafted program will regain the
promise it showed as a pilot project.
While Clean Break is open to businesses having no more than 200 full
time equivalent employees company-wide, it is not suitable for all noncompliance scenarios. Companies are ineligible for Clean Break if the violation:
25. Telephone interview with John Kelly, Manager, Office of Small Business, USEPA
Region 5 (Summer 1997).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Poses a substantial and imminent danger to public
health or the environment;
Was previously identified by IEPA;
Constitutes a felony;
Was deliberately committed on or after January 1,
1996;
Was discovered by IEPA through routine inspections
or citizen complaints during Clean Break negotiations;
or,
Is related to the cleanup of leaking petroleum tanks or
hazardous waste remediation.

According to John Kelley, the manager of USEPA's Office of Small
Business, an unexpected benefit of the Clean Break program has been in the
area of regulatory reform. Through Clean Break activities, small businesses
identified contradictory and outdated rules; as a result, IEPA is petitioning the
Illinois Pollution Control Board to amend three regulations.
In spite of the Clean Break and USEPA small business programs, there
is an almost nonexistent audit rate in the small business community.
Government programs face an uphill battle in getting the word out and gaining
the trust of this part of the economy.
IV.

DISCOVERY: DISCLOSURE ISTHE RULE UNLESS APRIVILEGE APPLIES

A. WHY DOES ACOMPANY NEED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE?
Should a company elect to perform an environmental audit or similar
activity, it should realize that its own audit report could be used against it and
possibly subject company employees to criminal prosecution. On the other
hand, a company can reduce its chances for incurring civil and criminal
liabilities by evaluating its own regulatory compliance activities and
remedying non-compliance before it comes to the attention of regulatory
agencies or third parties.
Many companies are reluctant to conduct audits out of fear of attracting
the type of enforcement actions and private lawsuits against which environmental audits are designed to protect. Although helpful to business, the state
audit laws do not provide an absolute privilege for audit materials; all have
provisions eliminating or narrowing the privilege if the underlying violation
is not corrected in a timely fashion. For precisely this reason, and despite the
attention trained on environmental audit laws, they are not a panacea for
industry's environmental ills. In order to ensure the utmost confidentiality of
audit activities, prudent management dictates that industry be informed of the
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existence of available privileges and programs and how they operate, and
incorporate them and the environmental audit privilege into a company's
strategic repertoire.
The "rules of the road" for federal civil litigation are found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules provide: "[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action ... if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 29
Historically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have served as models for
the rules of other jurisdictions (e.g., the Virginia discovery rules, the
Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, the civil rules of the District of Columbia
Superior Court). Consequently, while disclosure is the rule, various privileges
from disclosure are available to protect certain types of communications and
information.
B.

WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE

The "work product" privilege is the most frequently invoked basis for the
protection of information from discovery. Based on a 1947 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor,3" and the court's 1970 de facto
incorporation of that decision into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
work product privilege protects from disclosure "documents and tangible
things ... prepared in anticipation of litigation .... "31 Although the work
product privilege as recognized in Hickman v. Taylor only dealt with attorney
work product, the subsequent rule also specifically covers materials prepared
"by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative
32
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."
A 1993 amendment to the rules requires that privilege claims be
specifically detailed and information or documents withheld described
sufficiently to permit evaluation of the claim. 33 As yet, it is uncertain if one
must cite specific memorandums, letters, etc., or if one can simply note their
existence in a general way. To defeat this privilege, a party seeking discovery
must show it has a "substantial need" for the materials and that it is unable
without "undue hardship" to obtain the materials' substantial equivalent by
other means?3
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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Determining whether a document was prepared "in anticipation of
litigation" can be a difficult and costly undertaking. A court, rather than the
company, ultimately makes these determinations. Routine audit activities will
probably not meet this requirement; audits generally are performed to prevent
litigation as opposed to being conducted in anticipation of litigation. And in
all likelihood, a company seeking disclosure of an audit report could make a
good argument that an environmental audit report would be practically
impossible to replicate by other means. Further, with the current split in the
circuits over the applicability of this privilege, 35 any reliance on the work
product privilege would be a gamble.
C.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The roots of the attorney-client privilege date back to Roman law and
tradition and also were found in early English law. This privilege originally
was based on the notion of loyalty owed by a lawyer to the client, thus
prohibiting the lawyer from testifying against the client. The 18th century saw
the basis for the privilege change to the argument that litigation can be most
justly and expeditiously handled by experienced attorneys fully apprised of
the facts by the parties they represent.
The latest sweeping U.S. Supreme Court decision on this topic in the
corporate setting is the 1981 case of Upjohn Co. v. U.S.36 While the court
specifically declined to attempt to formulate a definitive rule on what is and
what is not privileged, it did suggest limitations on the attorney-client
privilege, according that status only if the information conveyed: (1) was at
the direction of management with an attorney, (2) is communicated for the
express purpose of securing legal advice for the corporation, (3) relates to the
specific corporate duties of the communicating employee, and (4) is treated
as confidential within the corporation itself.
From a practical standpoint, although various courts have protected
environmental audits from disclosure, the privilege's confidentiality and
"securing legal advice" requirements can be particularly problematic. Many
in-house attorneys wear dual hats such as corporate vice president or
secretary. A court may find that a person possessing a law degree rendering
advice does not necessarily provide legal advice - it may find that the person
was acting in a management capacity instead of a legal capacity. And with

35. Pitting the Second and Seventh Circuits' broad view that the privilege applies when
a document is prepared "because of" existing or expected litigation, versus the Fifth Circuit's
narrower interpretation that a document must exist "primarily to assist in litigation."
36. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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regard to information security, strict procedures may be required in order for
the company to convince a court that the company treats certain information
in a confidential manner.
D.

SELF-EVALUATION PRIVILEGE

The self-evaluation privilege dates to the 1970 federal appeals court
decision of Bredice v. DoctorsHospital,Inc.37 The privilege protects internal
records prepared by an institution to evaluate past performance. Three
requirements must be met to successfully invoke the privilege: (1) the
information must consist of the criticisms or evaluations or the product of an
evaluation or critique, (2) the unfettered internal availability of such
information should be encouraged as a matter of public policy, and (3) the
critique or evaluation must be of such a nature that similar types of inquiries
would cease if the information was subject to disclosure.
This privilege is well established in the medical and employment law
areas, and-seems equally suited to the environmental audit scenario, owing to
the strong public policy arguments in favor of promoting compliance and
cleanup efforts. Of note, public policy traditionally has been seen as a weak
argument in the eyes of the courts. Moreover, most courts have refused to
find environmental audits protected by the self-evaluation privilege.
CONCLUSION

There is no guarantee that an environmental audit will be protected from
disclosure. Environmental audit laws, programs, or policies may not be
applicable to a company's operations. In addition, the attorney-client
privilege necessarily requires the involvement of an attorney, the work product.
privilege is limited to litigation-related scenarios, and in terms of an
environmental audit, the self-evaluation privilege has a mixed record in the
courts. In light of these realities, all one can do is attempt to manage the
discoverability of audits by conducting audits in line with the legal privileges
potentially available.
Like it or not, an attorney should direct the conduct of an environmental
audit because engineers are not trained to interpret laws, regulations, policies,
and guidance documents. Moreover, an attorney's control over the activity
would initially meet some basic requirements for the imposition of the
attorney-client and work product privileges. Furthermore, the courts are more
likely to view an outside attorney, as opposed to in-house counsel, as acting

37.

50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970). affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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solely in a legal capacity and not in a managerial capacity, thereby upholding
a basis for the attorney-client privilege.
Top company management, and not lower echelon personnel, should
make the decision as to whether an environmental audit is undertaken. An
attorney should control the drafting of the audit report. If an outside
environmental consultant is used, the attorney, and not the company, should
do the hiring. The report should include a legal analysis of all the potential
problems with the company's regulatory compliance activities. The report
should be written in a brief but concise way. The company also should
institute an information security program to limit access to the report, with
case-by-case access determinations made by company management.
Above all, any company conducting an audit must be prepared to correct
whatever problem it finds. A $1,000 problem may not cause a big splash, but
a $500,000 problem could devastate a company. In addition, one's failure to
correct the situation could turn a civil violation into a criminal matter.
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APPENDIX
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT POLICIES

July 1986

USEPA retains right to request disclosure of audit reports, but
commits to no "routine" requests.
USEPA will not forego inspections, but consideration given to
prioritizing enforcement efforts.

July 1991

DOJ views environmental audit as "mitigating factor" in
criminal prosecutions.

July 1994

USEPA states no change in policy."a

April 1995

USEPA threatens states passing audit privilege laws with
closer enforcement scrutiny and increased federal enforcement.
USEPA will not request disclosure of audit reports to trigger
investigations.
USEPA waives punitive (but not economic benefit) penalties
for voluntary identification, disclosure, and correction of
violations.
USEPA will not refer criminal cases to DOJ for prosecution so
long as no serious actual harm has occurred.

Dec 1995

USEPA recognizes broad audit concept covering formal audits
and due diligence activities.
USEPA waives punitive penalties for violations promptly
disclosed (within 10 days) and corrected (within 60 days)
which were found through audits or due diligence investigations.

38.
(1994).

Restatement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,455
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USEPA reduces punitive penalties by 75% for violations
promptly disclosed and corrected outside of audit or due
diligence investigations.
USEPA retains the economic benefit penalty calculation for all
violations.
USEPA generally will not refer criminal cases to DOJ for
prosecution.
USEPA will refrain from routine requests to disclose audit
reports.
May 1996

USEPA includes audit activities in the coverage of its "Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses" program, which
waives all penalties for companies having no more than 100
employees.
USEPA AUDrr CONDmONS3 9

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

A "systematic" environmental compliance program led to discovery of
violation.
Violation must be identified voluntarily, and "not through a legally
mandated monitoring or sampling requirement .... "
Written disclosure of violation to USEPA within 10 days after discovery.
Violation must be identified and disclosed prior to the commencement
of a governmental investigation, notice of citizen suit, the filing of a
complaint by a third party, a whistleblower employee's reporting the
violation to a regulatory agency, or the imminent discovery of the
violation by a regulatory agency.
Company corrects violation within 60 days, certifies in writing that the
violation is corrected, and remedies environmental and public health
harms.
Company agrees in writing to take steps to prevent recurrence of the
violation.

39. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,708-712 (1995).
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No pattern of environmental violations by parent company, and no prior
violations for this particular or closely related provision within three
years at the particular facility involved.
No violations of judicial or administrative orders or consent agreements,
or violations resulting in "serious actual harm," or presenting "an
imminent and substantial endangerment" to human health or the
environment.
Company cooperates with USEPA in providing necessary documents and
investigative assistance, and grants access to employees.

